Basic Argument vs Ultimate Moral Responsibility (Galen Strawson Summary)

This post outlines 10+ versions of the Galen Strawson basic argument against ultimate moral responsibility. Enjoy!

🔒 Premium members also have access to the companion post: Stream of Consciousness: Is Ultimate Moral Responsibility a Myth?

Quick Housekeeping:

All content in “quotation marks” is directly from the original author.
All content is organized into my own themes.
Emphasis has been added in bold for readability/skimmability.

Post Contents:

Overview
Simple Version
Causa Sui Versions
Change Versions
Expanded Versions

The Basic Argument against Ultimate Moral Responsibility (Galen Strawson Summary)

The Basic Argument (Overview)

“It’s a completely a priori argument, as philosophers like to say. That means that you can see that it is true just lying on your couch. You don’t have to get up off your couch and go outside and examine the way things are in the physical world. You don’t have to do any science.”

“Many human beings are unable to resist the idea that it is their capacity for fully explicit self-conscious deliberation, in a situation of choice, that suffices to constitute them as truly morally responsible agents in the strongest possible sense. The Basic Argument shows that this is a mistake. However self-consciously aware we are, as we deliberate and reason, every act and operation of our mind happens as it does as a result of features for which we are ultimately in no way responsible.”

“According to the Basic Argument, it makes no difference whether determinism is true or false. We can’t be ultimately morally responsible either way … The evident consequence of the Basic Argument is that there is a fundamental sense in which no punishment or reward is ever ultimately just. It is exactly as just to punish or reward people for their actions as it is to punish or reward them for the (natural) colour of their hair or the (natural) shape of their faces.”

“The Basic Argument appears to show that we can never be ultimately morally responsible for our actions … You are a thing made not ultimately by you … How might we be changed by dwelling intensely on the view that ultimate responsibility is impossible?”

In a nutshell: “What we would need for true-desert-entailing freedom (this is one way of putting it, at least) is not just indeterminism but true self-determination on the part of free agents. To put the point very brieﬂy: if we are to be truly deserving of praise and blame for our actions, then, since our intentional actions are necessarily a function of how we are, mentally, we must be truly responsible for how we are mentally, at least in certain vital respects. We must be genuine ‘originators’ of ourselves, and our natures, at least in certain respects. But the attempt to describe how we could possibly be true originators of ourselves in this way leads self-defeatingly to infinite regress (quite apart from being quite fantastically unrealistic): for even if one could somehow choose how to be, and then bring it about that one was that way, one would in order to do this already have to have existed prior to that choice, with a certain set of preferences about how to be, in the light of which one chose how to be. But then the question would arise: where did these preferences come from? Or were they just there, unchosen preferences for which one was not responsible? And so on. This argument proceeds completely independently of any appeal to determinism or indeterminism, and if valid shows that true-desert-entailing freedom of will is provably impossible—impossible whether determinism is true or false.”

The Basic Argument (Simple Version)

“You do what you do—in the circumstances in which you find yourself—because of the way you then are.
So if you’re going to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you’re going to have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain mental respects.
But you can’t be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do.”

**The Basic Argument (Causa Sui Versions)**

“Nothing can be causa sui—nothing can be the cause of itself.
In order to be truly or ultimately morally responsible for one’s actions one would have to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects.
Therefore, no one can be truly or ultimately morally responsible.”

“One cannot be causa sui—one cannot be the ultimate, originating cause of oneself.
But one would have to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects, in order to be ultimately morally responsible for one’s decisions and actions.
So one cannot be ultimately morally responsible for one’s decisions or actions: one cannot be ultimately morally deserving of praise or blame for one’s decisions or actions or one’s character or indeed for anything else.”

“When you act, at a given time t, you do what you do, in the situation in which you find yourself at t, because of the way you are, at t.
But if you do what you do at t because of the way you are at t, then in order to be ultimately (morally) responsible for what you do, at t (in order to be U-free, at t), you must be ultimately (morally) responsible for the way you are, at t, at least in certain fundamental, mental respects.
But to be ultimately morally responsible for the way you are, at t, in certain fundamental mental respects, you’d have to be causa sui in those respects.
But nothing can be ultimately causa sui in any respect at all (or if God can be, nothing else can be).
So you can’t be ultimately morally responsible for what you do—you can’t be U-free.”

The Basic Argument (Change Versions)

“It is undeniable that one is the way one is as a result of one’s heredity and experience.
One cannot somehow accede to true responsibility for oneself by trying to change the way one is as a result of heredity and experience.
For both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree of one’s success in the attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity and experience. And any further changes that one can successfully bring about only after certain initial changes have been brought about will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by heredity and experience.”

“It is undeniable that one is the way one is, initially, as a result of heredity and early experience, and it is undeniable that these are things for which one cannot be held to be in any way responsible (morally or otherwise).
One cannot at any later stage of life hope to accede to true moral responsibility for the way one is by trying to change the way one already is as a result of heredity and previous experience.
Both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree of one’s success in one’s attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity and previous experience.
Any further changes that one can bring about only after one has brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by heredity and previous experience.”

“It’s undeniable that the way you are initially is a result of your genetic inheritance and early experience.
It’s undeniable that these are things for which you can’t be held to be in any way responsible (morally or otherwise).
But you can’t at any later stage of life hope to acquire true or ultimate moral responsibility for the way you are by trying to change the way you already are as a result of genetic inheritance and previous experience.
Why not? Because both the particular ways in which you try to change yourself, and the amount of success you have when trying to change yourself, will be determined by how you already are as a result of your genetic inheritance and previous experience.
And any further changes that you may become able to bring about after you have brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by your genetic inheritance and previous experience.”

The Basic Argument (Expanded Versions)

“(A) One is the way one is, initially, as a result of heredity and early experience.
(B) These are clearly things for which one can’t be held to be in any way responsible. (This might not be true if there were reincarnation, but this would just shift the problem backwards.)
(C) One cannot at any later stage of one’s life hope to accede to ultimate responsibility for the way one is by trying to change the way one already is as a result of heredity and experience. For one may well try to change oneself, but
(D) Both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree of one’s success in one’s attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity and experience. And
(E) Any further changes that one can bring about only after one has brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by heredity and previous experience. This may not be the whole story, for
(F) It may be that some changes in the way one is are traceable to the influence of indeterministic or random factors. But
(G) It’s absurd to suppose that indeterministic or random factors, for which one is in no way responsible, can in themselves contribute to one’s being truly or ultimately responsible for how one is.”

“Interested in free action, we are particularly interested in actions performed for reasons, intentional actions as opposed to reflex actions or mindlessly habitual actions. We wish to show that such actions can be free.
How one acts when one acts intentionally for a reason is, necessarily, a function of, or determined by, how one is, mentally speaking. (One does not at present need to be more precise than this; one could add ‘at the time of action’ after ‘mentally speaking’.)
If, therefore, one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking — in certain respects, at least.
But to be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must have chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects. It is not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way one is, mentally speaking; that is not sufficient for true responsibility. One must have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, at least, and one must have succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way.
But one cannot really be said to choose to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice, ‘P1’ — with preferences, values, pro-attitudes, ideals, whatever — in the light of which one chooses how to be.
But then to be truly responsible on account of having chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must be truly responsible for one’s having these principles of choice P1.
But for this to be so one must have chosen them in turn.
But for this, i.e. (7), to be so one must already have had some principles of choice, P2, in the light of which one chose P1.
And so on. True self-determination is logically impossible because it requires the actual completion of an infinite regress of choices of principles of choice.”

“(i) Interested in free action, we’re particularly interested in actions performed for reasons (as opposed to reflex actions or mindlessly habitual actions).
(ii) When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of how one is, mentally speaking. (It’s also a function of one’s height, one’s strength, one’s place and time, and so on, but it’s the mental factors that are crucial when moral responsibility is in question.)
(iii) So if one is going to be truly or ultimately responsible for how one acts, one must be ultimately responsible for how one is, mentally speaking — at least in certain respects.
(iv) But to be ultimately responsible for how one is, in any mental respect, one must have brought it about that one is the way one is, in that respect. And it’s not merely that one must have caused oneself to be the way one is, in that respect. One must also have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, in that respect, and one must also have succeeded in bringing it about that one is that way.
(v) But one can’t really be said to choose, in a conscious, reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice, ‘P1’ — preferences, values, ideals — in the light of which one chooses how to be.
(vi) But then to be ultimately responsible, on account of having chosen to be the way one is, in certain mental respects, one must be ultimately responsible for one’s having the principles of choice P1 in the light of which one chose how to be.
(vii) But for this to be so one must have chosen P1, in a reasoned, conscious, intentional fashion.
(viii) But for this to be so one must already have had some principles of choice P2, in the light of which one chose P1.
(ix) And so on. Here we are setting out on a regress that we cannot stop. Ultimate responsibility for how one is is impossible, because it requires the actual completion of an infinite series of choices of principles of choice.
(x) So ultimate, buck-stopping moral responsibility is impossible, because it requires ultimate responsibility for how one is; as noted in (iii).”

1. “What you intentionally do, given the circumstances in which you (believe you) find yourself, flows necessarily from how you are. Hence

2. You have to get to have some responsibility for how you are in order to get to have some responsibility for what you intentionally do, given the circumstances in which you (believe you) find yourself.

Comment: once again the qualification about ‘certain mental respects’ is one I will take for granted. Obviously one is not responsible for one’s sex, one’s basic body pattern, one’s height, and so on. But if one were not responsible for anything about oneself, how could one be responsible for what one did, given the truth of (1)? This is the fundamental question, and it seems clear that if one is going to be responsible for any aspect of oneself, it had better be some aspect of one’s mental nature. I take it that (1) is incontrovertible, and that it is (2) that must be resisted. For if (1) and (2) are conceded the case seems lost, because the full argument runs as follows…

1. You do what you do because of the way you are. So

2. To be truly morally responsible for what you do you must be truly responsible for the way are—at least in certain crucial mental respects. But

3. You cannot be truly responsible for the way you are, so you cannot be truly responsible for what you do. Why can’t you be truly responsible for the way you are? Because

4. To be truly responsible for the way you are, you must have intentionally brought it about that you are the way you are, and this is impossible. Why is it impossible? Well, suppose it is not. Suppose that

5. You have somehow intentionally brought it about that you are the way you now are, and that you have brought this about in such a way that you can now be said to be truly responsible for being the way you are now. For this to be true

6. You must already have had a certain nature N in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you are as you now are. But then

7. For it to be true you and you alone are truly responsible for how you now are, you must be truly responsible for having had the nature N in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you are the way you now are. So

You must have intentionally brought it about that you had that nature N, in which case you must have existed already with a prior nature in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you had the nature N in the light of which you intentionally brought it about that you are the way you now are . . . Here one is setting off on the regress. Nothing can be causa sui in the required way.”

A final way to think about self-change: “We are born with a great many genetically determined predispositions for which we are not responsible. We are subject to many early influences for which we are not responsible. These decisively shape our characters, our motives, the general bent and strength of our capacity to make efforts of will. We may later engage in conscious and intentional shaping procedures—call them S-procedures—designed to affect and change our characters, motivational structure, and wills. Suppose we do. The question is then why we engage in the particular S-procedures that we do engage in, and why we engage in them in the particular way that we do. The general answer is that we engage in the particular S-procedures that we do engage in, given the circumstances in which we find ourselves, because of certain features of the way we already are. (Indeterministic factors may also play a part in what happens, but these will not help to make us responsible for what we do.) And these features of the way we already are—call them character features, or C-features—are either wholly the products of genetic or environmental influences, deterministic or random, for which we are not responsible, or are at least partly the result of earlier S-procedures, which are in turn either wholly the product of C-features for which we are not responsible, or are at least partly the product of still earlier S-procedures, which are turn either the products of C-features for which we are not responsible, or the product of such C-features together with still earlier S-procedures—and so on. In the end, we reach the first S-procedure, and this will have been engaged in, and engaged in the particular way in which it was engaged in, as a result of genetic or environmental factors, deterministic or random, for which we were not responsible.”